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Abstract 4 
 5 
Background 6 
The British Army has over 100 career employment groups to which recruits may apply.  The 7 
Infantry is one of these career employment groups; it accounts for 25% of the overall strength. It 8 
is of concern that Infantry recruit attrition within the first 12 weeks of training remains 9 
consistently above 30%. Poor selection methods that lead to the enlistment of unsuitable recruits 10 
have negative financial and personal consequences, but little is known about the personal 11 
experiences of those who fail 12 
   13 
Objective 14 
The aim of this research was to understand why infantry recruits choose to leave and explore the 15 
personal experiences of those that fail.  16 
 17 
Methods 18 
This study draws on qualitative data from the second phase of a larger mixed method study.  The 19 
foci of this paper are the findings directly related to the responses of recruits in exit interviews 20 
and their Commanding Officers’ training reports.  An exploratory qualitative, inductive method 21 
was used to generate insights, explanations and potential solutions to training attrition.  22 
 23 
Results 24 
What the data describes is a journey of extreme situational demands that the recruits experience 25 
throughout their transition from civilian life to service in the British Infantry.  It is the cumulative 26 
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effect of the stressors, combined with the recruit being dislocated from their established support 27 
network, which appears to be the catalyst for failure among recruits. 28 
 29 
Conclusion 30 
There are clearly defined areas where either further research or changes to current practice may 31 
provide a better understanding of, and ultimately reduce, the current attrition rates experienced by 32 
the Infantry Training Centre.  33 
 34 
 Keywords: Work place stress, Work Environment, Recruitment, Qualitative Analysis, 35 
British Army, military, training attrition,   36 
  37 
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1. Introduction 38 
The British Army has over 100 career employment groups to which recruits may apply.  39 
The Infantry is one of these career employment groups; it accounts for nearly a quarter of the 40 
overall strength of the British Army and, in the financial year ending 2013, 5380 recruits passed 41 
out of the Infantry Training Centre and joined the infantry regiments of the British Army (1).  It 42 
is of concern that infantry recruit attrition within the first 12 weeks of training remains 43 
consistently above 30% (2).  Nearly three quarters of this attrition is attributed to psychological, 44 
personnel and disciplinary reasons rather than physical failure (2).  As Borman et al., (3) argue, 45 
poor selection methods that lead to the enlistment of unsuitable recruits have negative financial 46 
and personal consequences, but little is known about the personal experiences of those who fail.  47 
This research aimed to understand reasons why recruits fail, or choose to leave, so that informed 48 
approaches can be taken to address these consistent high rates of attrition.  49 
 50 
Organisations are social entities with distinctive and enduring characteristics (Albert et al. 51 
(4). Membership of particular organisations, modulated by the extent to which the organisation’s 52 
‘cognitive structures’ (5) are embraced, constitutes a specific part of an individual’s social 53 
identity known as their ‘organisational identity’. Military organisations are distinctive due to the 54 
totality of their nature and their specific induction programmes. Ashforth and Mael (6) identify 55 
from  Fisher’s (7) and Goffman’s (8) work on total and quasi-total institutions, the potential 56 
difficulties and psychological conflict organisational newcomers might experience when adapting 57 
to a new organisation such as the military.  Unlike a job in civilian society (such as a 58 
supermarket) the military adopt induction behaviours to encourage the newcomer to feel as if 59 
they belong, and to separate them from their previous life. So, for example, on arrival at basic 60 
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training  symbols of the recruit’s previous identity are removed, their hair is cut, their clothes 61 
removed and codes of dress and behaviour are imposed.  These are all methods of encouraging 62 
the individual to adapt to their new environment and encourage internalisation of the 63 
organisation’s goals and values. The process provides the individual with the initial trappings of 64 
an identity consistent with the organisation’s expectations.   However, during this transitional 65 
period the individual’s pre-existing beliefs and attitudes are challenged which causes varying 66 
degrees of cognitive discomfort as the individual prioritises the military identity within the 67 
hierarchy of their social identity.  The impact on the individual’s social identity can be both 68 
positive and negative. 69 
 70 
Studies undertaken in Israel explore the impact of compulsory military service on the 71 
development of an individual’s social and individual identity.  Bleich and Levy et al (9) argue 72 
that a crisis in identity occurs when young Israelis are conscripted into the army. Hampson (10) 73 
identified what training staff referred to as ‘culture-shock’ in recruits who were unable to manage 74 
the expectations of their new surroundings and withdrew from training.  Hale (11) argues that 75 
recruits make a transition from belonging to a civilian culture only, to also being a member of a 76 
military one, and that on enlistment recruits experience a ‘rupture’ as everything that was certain 77 
and familiar for the individual becomes uncertain and unfamiliar and the rupture (the name given 78 
to the period of transition to military life) plays a pivotal role in how the individual constructs 79 
their military identity.  80 
 81 
The highest rate of newcomer attrition occurs within the first 12 weeks of training (Army 82 
Recruitment and Training Division, 2) as recruits attempt to adjust to the physical reality of 83 
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military life (5, 11), adapting their social identity to achieve acceptance and belonging. However, 84 
questions remain as to why recruits choose to reject the military after expending so much time 85 
and energy to join. The main focus of previous British studies into this early drop-out has been 86 
centred around  predicting attrition based on service wide assumptions on why recruits leave e.g. 87 
homesickness, physical failure, injury etc. (10-16). This study argues that the identities and 88 
cultures of different career employment groups within the services are distinctive, and corps such  89 
as the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) can see an attrition rate of as little as  5% (2). It is 90 
argued that soldiers entering the RAMC have a very different lived experience to those 91 
undertaking training in the infantry and, as such, the unique experience of the infantry recruit 92 
who withdraws from training has to be studied to truly understand the exceptionally high failure 93 
rate found in this career employment group.  94 
 95 
2. Aim   96 
 97 
The aim of this study was to explore the reasons given by recruits who failed to complete 98 
infantry training in order to gain an understanding of the process they go through: their journey to 99 
leaving, with a particular emphasis on the factors to which they attribute failure and the impact 100 
that these have on the individual. 101 
 102 
  103 
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3. Methods 104 
3.1 Design 105 
This paper draws on qualitative data from the second phase of a larger mixed method 106 
study.  The first phase of the mixed method study was a survey design which provided a wide 107 
range of biographical data on recruits. The foci of this paper are the findings directly related to 108 
the responses of recruits in exit interviews and their Commanding Officers’ training report when 109 
they failed to complete infantry training.  110 
 111 
3.2 Setting, Sample and Recruitment 112 
The study was conducted at the British Army Infantry Training Centre. It was undertaken 113 
over a period of six months with 1000 infantry recruits who volunteered to have their training 114 
progression monitored. When a recruit left training, for any reason, they were invited to take part 115 
in an interview. 116 
The recruitment process began with an introduction to the study to all potential study 117 
recruits in the absence of training staff. This outlined the purpose of the study, what was involved 118 
in taking part, and aimed to reduce the pressure on the volunteers so they did not feel coerced into 119 
participation.  The initial presentation covered the aims of the study, consent and assurance of 120 
confidentiality regarding data collected.  All potential recruits were provided with an information 121 
sheet outlining the purpose and nature of the study and were then given four hours to consider 122 
participation.  Recruits had to actively return to the medical centre if they wished to participate in 123 
the study. 124 
 125 
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3.3 Data Collection 126 
 Study recruits who agreed to participate were interviewed within 48 hours of 127 
making the decision to leave or  being notified that their training was being discontinued (i.e. 128 
they were being dismissed from the Army). Interviews were undertaken with recruits who 129 
discontinued within the first five weeks of training, since previous studies on recruit attrition 130 
within the British Army demonstrate that this is the period of highest attrition (10, 11, 16).  Once 131 
recruits commence infantry training they have to serve a minimum of 28 days before they can 132 
apply to leave. Recruits can be dismissed from service within that 28 day period if they breach 133 
discipline, have medical problems or are deemed unsuitable for service in the army by the 134 
training staff.  One hundred recruits were interviewed over a 6 month period as they left training.  135 
 136 
A semi-structured interview template was developed from discussions with training staff 137 
and previous studies into training attrition within the British Army (10, 16).   Interviews were 138 
designed to allow the individual to express their own reasons for leaving above and beyond those 139 
expressed to their Commanding Officer in their training report leaving interviews. The aim being 140 
that the recruit was invited to tell their own story within a framework of questions (see figure 1). 141 
When developing the interview template training staff, who agreed to be interviewed in the pilot 142 
study, described recruits who failed to complete training as usually being very unhappy. To 143 
gauge the mood of all the recruits that failed to complete training a modified Subjective Units of 144 
Disturbance (SUD) scale was used.  Subjective units of disturbance is a widely accepted tool in 145 
getting participants to rate, on a scale of 0-10, how disturbed a given situation has made them feel 146 
(17). Participants were asked to rate their mood on a scale of 0-10, 0 being the saddest that they 147 
had ever felt and 10 being their normal mood. 148 
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In addition to interviews with recruits, the training leaving reports written by the recruits’ 149 
Commanding Officers were analysed. Previous studies by Hampson (10) and Sirett (16) report 150 
reasons for why recruits leave training; however, during the pilot study the accuracy of the 151 
training report was brought into question, as training staff suggested that recruits told their 152 
Commanding Officer “what he wanted to hear”. If this phenomenon was occurring it was 153 
important to understand why. It was felt that an important part of the study was to compare the 154 
interview transcripts and the training reports in order to better understand the reasons for failure. 155 
 156 
Once all interviews had been completed, the interview transcripts were purposively 157 
sampled to maximise variation and include a wide selection of recruits. British Army infantry 158 
regiments recruit from certain areas of the UK so, for example, each training intake might consist 159 
of recruits from Liverpool or Manchester. This method ensured that the sample analysed reflected 160 
the recruit population across the United Kingdom and not those from just one geographical area. 161 
The interview transcripts were sampled until theoretical saturation had been achieved. 162 
Theoretical saturation suggests that not only has the data achieved descriptive saturation, but also 163 
the analysis describes how the various codes, categories and concepts interconnect (18). 164 
 165 
3.4 Analysis 166 
The aim of this study was to explore the reasons given by those recruits who failed to complete 167 
infantry training in order to gain an understanding of the process they go through. Given its clear 168 
focus and application, framework analysis, an applied research methodology, was selected. 169 
Although developed as an  applied policy research methodology (19), framework analysis 170 
facilitates systematic analysis of data and helps to achieve specified aims and outputs (20).  It was 171 
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chosen for this study because it has the capacity to handle data from a large number of subjects in 172 
a rigorous, transparent and logical process of textual analysis. One of the key benefits of the 173 
framework approach is its transparency. The ability to trace all interpretations back to the textual 174 
source through the index system coupled with the systematic approach to data reduction adds a 175 
high degree of trustworthiness and reliability to the findings.   176 
 177 
The study gained full ethical and scientific approval from Defence Medical Services 178 
Clinical Research Committee and has been assigned the unique project number 082.   179 
 180 
  181 
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4. Results 182 
 183 
The results are reported in the following sections under three main headings: Population 184 
Demographics, Institutional Demands and Individual Demands. A sample of the demographic 185 
data, taken from the overarching survey study, is included to give a feel for the recruit population 186 
and the overall outcome of the 1000 recruits that entered training and were being monitored. The 187 
main findings of this paper are from data collected from both the interview transcripts and the 188 
training leaving reports written by the recruits’ Commanding Officer. 189 
 190 
Population Demographics 191 
The study population was male with a mean age of 20.0 years and an age range of 17.2 192 
years to 27.4 years.  The ethnic mix was predominately white British (95.6%, n=853) with only 193 
25 (2.8%) recruits recording themselves as Black British.  The category labelled ‘other’ consisted 194 
of 11 recruits who recorded their ethnicity as Indian (n=2), Pakistani (n=1), Chinese (n=1) and 195 
mixed race (n=7).   196 
 197 
Within the study population, 11.3% (n=112) did not know their father. However 84.3% 198 
(n=834) came from homes where their father was in employment, with only 4.4% (n=43) of 199 
fathers having not worked.  The majority of the sample (53.1%, n=517) achieved GCSE results of 200 
grade C or below, with only 14.8% achieving grade B or above in all subjects.  Notable was that 201 
over half of all respondents (53.3%, n=533) reported being in trouble with the police prior to 202 
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enlistment. Certain drugs was common amongst the recruits with just over a third, (32.4%, 203 
n=324) of them having used cannabis in the year prior to joining the Army.   204 
 205 
From the study population being observed 36% (n=362) left infantry training.  Within this 206 
group 59.4% (n=215) left at their own request and 13.9% (n=50) were dismissed as Service No 207 
Longer Required or were deemed Unsuitable for Army Service (see Table 1).  Of those who did 208 
not complete Infantry Training (n=362) 4.4% (n=16) went on to transfer to other branches or 209 
career employment groups within the Army. Figure 2 explains the discharge categories. Of the 210 
362 recruits who failed to complete infantry training, 27% (n=100) volunteered to be 211 
interviewed. Through purposive sampling of those transcripts (this included both the interview 212 
transcripts and the Commanding Officer’s leaving report) theoretical saturation was achieved 213 
with 32 transcripts. 214 
 215 
Institutional Demands 216 
4.1. Coping 217 
The recruits’ ability or inability to cope with the situational stressors or demands of the 218 
enlistment journey is fundamental to their success or failure to complete training.  The impact of 219 
those demands was not linear; they appeared to have a cyclical action on each other, leading to a 220 
helix effect as each demand in turn challenged the recruit’s ability to cope.   221 
 222 
This association is most prominent in the data when observing the effect that performance 223 
and mood appear to have upon each other.  By looking at the response of the recruits, and 224 
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comparing them with their Commanding Officer’s assessments, it is possible to distinguish a 225 
cycle of behavioural decline taking place (Figure 3).   226 
 227 
Figure 3 demonstrates the typical pattern observed as the recruit began to fail in training.  228 
The data suggested that as a recruit’s mood declined so did his training performance, which in 229 
turn made him question his reasons for being there. There was no clear starting point for this 230 
decline, because it appeared that the institutional and individual stressors subtly started the cycle 231 
as each stressor eroded the individual’s ability to cope.  The stressors built up to a point when the 232 
individual could no longer cope with how they were feeling. The point at which this level was 233 
reached was clearly different in each individual, as demonstrated by the timings when recruits left 234 
(some after four weeks, some after four months).  What was clear was that self-doubt began to 235 
creep in and impacted on both mood and performance.  The outcome of this cyclic process was 236 
that the recruit made the conscious decision that the Army was not for him (or alternatively that 237 
he did not belong there or fit in). 238 
 239 
Each recruit had a unique reason for leaving. It was clear that although isolated stressors 240 
were perceived to be manageable, multiple stressors, combined with the recruit being away from 241 
their normal social support network led to an inability to cope. The psychological and physical 242 
combination resulted in the situation becoming overwhelming: 243 
 244 
‘ I found the training very hard; I was always playing catch up..’ 245 
Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 246 
 247 
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‘I don’t like being away from home for long periods….I feel homesick….I miss my son..’ 248 
Recruit 11 (Discharge as of Right) 249 
 250 
 251 
‘I find the training and discipline hard….I am in trouble most days…I make lots of mistakes and 252 
the platoon gets beasted’ 253 
Recruit 15 (Discharge as of Right) 254 
 255 
If extracts from the Commanding Officer’s reports are examined for Recruits 4 and 15 it 256 
is possible to detect that not only did their ability to cope decline and their mood deteriorate, but 257 
their ability to perform and achieve the most basic demands of training declined to such an extent 258 
that if they had not decided to leave then that decision would have been made for them: 259 
 260 
‘…has failed to adapt to Army life….presented himself to the medical centre daily from week one 261 
with a range of ailments….I suspected there was nothing wrong…just avoiding training’ 262 
Commanding Officer of Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 263 
 264 
 ‘…has irritated instructors and peers to such an extent that he has been removed from training 265 
and supervised in Head Quarters…….training that he did complete was poor with no 266 
determination to succeed  no chance of him ever passing basic…should not be allowed to re-267 
enlist’ 268 
Commanding Officer of Recruit 15 (Discharge as of Right) 269 
 270 
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As Recruit 15 described, his performance began to deteriorate which caused him to get 271 
the whole platoon punished for his mistakes.  His peers then ostracised him as they very quickly 272 
became irritated by his inability to keep up with training.  This resulted in him questioning his 273 
compatibility with the infantry, which led to him being further ostracised. Ultimately he made the 274 
conscious decision that he did not belong, and this appears to be the point at which all attempts to 275 
cope ceased and Recruit 15 gave up.  This pattern is typical: once a recruit reaches the point 276 
where they decide that they no longer can cope then the cycle of decline, Figure 5, becomes 277 
terminal. 278 
 279 
4.2. Fitting In 280 
The sense of not ‘fitting-in’ was one reason given for not coping, the end result of not 281 
coping or an amalgam of all factors relating to coping.  The concept of ‘fitting-in’ was a 282 
consistent theme throughout all the interviews. Interestingly, ‘not fitting in’ was not isolated to 283 
those recruits that chose to leave, but was also expressed by those that were dismissed or deemed 284 
unsuitable for army service.  This would suggest that a sense of ‘not fitting in’ was a common 285 
belief in those that failed to complete the course. What is clear is that once recruits decided that 286 
they no longer fitted in, leaving was inevitable. What was apparent was that there was very rarely 287 
any singular reason for why the recruit believed that they did not fit-in.   Rather, it was a complex 288 
framework of personal beliefs and thoughts stimulated by the multiple stressors that they have 289 
been exposed to.  It was the complex collection of thoughts and beliefs behind the decision to 290 
leave that was of primary interest. They provide the understanding and evidence of commonality 291 
of thought process in most of the recruits that left training, most notably the belief, for whatever 292 
reason, that they did not fit into life in the Army.  293 
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  294 
‘I do not fit in with army culture; I find it too mentally demanding……I have tried to get on with 295 
it..’  296 
Recruit 1 (Discharge as of Right) 297 
‘I don’t like it…..I don’t enjoy the work….I don’t fit into the lifestyle….I have let my family down 298 
by leaving but I feel I rushed my decision to join.’ 299 
Recruit 5 (Discharge as of Right) 300 
‘this was a big mistake; I do not fit into the 24 hour life style – 24 hour job.  I find other recruits 301 
immature.’ 302 
Recruit 7 (Discharge as of Right) 303 
 304 
 305 
‘army life is not for me, I don’t like it….I was not ready for it…it was harder than I thought.’ 306 
Recruit 12 (Discharge as of Right) 307 
 308 
 309 
‘I don’t  like the way that they speak to me……..I don’t fit into army life, I have made friends but 310 
I don’t like the culture here.’ 311 
Recruit 13 (Discharge as of Right) 312 
 313 
 314 
Recruit 4 found the training hard and felt that he was always physically playing catch up. 315 
A point came when he began to feel that he did not fit in and became increasingly homesick, 316 
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wanting to return to his family. Ultimately he requested to Discharge as of Right.  His Company 317 
Commander however made the following observations: 318 
 319 
‘he was very homesick……failed to adapt to Army life…he has the capability to pass but would 320 
need to show far more commitment’ 321 
Commanding Officer Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 322 
 323 
4.3. Physical & Cultural Demands 324 
The recruits’ response to the situation in which they found themselves combined with the 325 
way in which they thought about that situation and how they tried to cope with it became 326 
important factors within the data.  All the study recruits were exposed to similar situational and 327 
environmental stressors; however each recruit reacted differently to the situation that they found 328 
themselves in as they tried to make sense of what was happening to them. It appeared that the 329 
recruits who failed had difficulty in understanding or comprehending why they were being 330 
subjected to certain rules and expectations. For example, recruit 6 could not understand why 331 
discipline was so hard and why this experience was so different to what he had experienced in the 332 
Army Cadets.  333 
 334 
‘I don’t like the army…..I don’t like the hardness of the physical training…….far more 335 
disciplined than the Army Cadets’ 336 
Recruit 6 (Discharged as of Right) 337 
 338 
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The psychological impact of activities such as physical training appeared to erode the 339 
recruits’ resolve to continue.  At the point where they could no longer find any relevance in their 340 
own mind for the tasks they were being asked to perform, the situation became overwhelming 341 
very quickly.   342 
 343 
Initial training is partly about ensuring that unsuitable candidates, who would not cope 344 
with the Infantry role, are excluded at an early stage.  There are always going to be recruits who 345 
could never meet the physical demands as they were unsuitable for Army services from the 346 
outset.  Recruit 9 is a good example of this, as his Commanding Officer’s reports suggest that he 347 
lacked the emotional maturity and robustness to make the transition to Army life and succeed in 348 
training. Recruit 9 clearly made a distinct adverse impression on his Commanding Officer: 349 
 350 
‘I miss my girlfriend ………my freedom…I am too young for this life at the moment’ 351 
Recruit 9 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 352 
 353 
‘he is severely depressed and cannot handle the regime within the training establishment…….he 354 
is not physically or mentally strong enough for the Army and should not be allowed to re-join as 355 
he is not suited in any shape or form’ 356 
Commanding Officer Recruit 9 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 357 
 358 
The concept of freedom and the loss of it were very prominent amongst the institutional 359 
factors.  This restriction of movement and an inability to come and go when they pleased had a 360 
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detrimental effect on those that were clearly used to being in control of their own daily routine 361 
and movements. 362 
 363 
‘I want to be my own person; I don’t want to be told what to do all the time….I don’t like the lack 364 
of privacy’ 365 
Recruit 7 (Discharge as of Right) 366 
 367 
‘ I hate being confined in the barracks and the people I have to mix with….the Army has 368 
prevented me from making friends as we are always in competition with each other’  ‘I don’t fit 369 
in here, the sacrifices are too great….the training is bullshit….the blokes are idiots who I would 370 
never associate with outside of here’ 371 
Recruit 30 (Discharge as of Right) 372 
 373 
‘I am finding the communal living and the loss of freedom difficult…….it’s difficult to be around 374 
younger recruits who mess around a lot and cause trouble’ 375 
Recruit 27 (Services no Longer Required) 376 
 377 
These responses convey the variety of meanings attached to the loss of freedom.  Some 378 
recruits focused on the lack of privacy and the communal living, others found the restrictions on 379 
their time and free movement the hardest part. They expressed that not being able to walk out of 380 
the camp to the shops or make phone call when they wanted to an extremely restrictive 381 
environment to live in. What is most interesting is that all these reasons seem to be over-arched 382 
by the question of what the recruit’s expectation of life in basic training was.  It is evident that 383 
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amongst the recruits who failed there was a either a nostalgic view or little comprehension of 384 
what to expect on enlistment.  Recruit 6 reflects on the discipline and his experiences in the Army 385 
Cadets and is genuinely surprised that he finds it too hard; he also finds it difficult to understand 386 
why enlistment in the regular Army is so different.  Recruit 9 reflects on his experiences in the 387 
Territorial Army:   388 
 389 
 390 
‘I feel trapped….I have lost my freedom…. The Army is always on my mind, the discipline is too 391 
hard…..far more discipline than the Army Cadets’ 392 
Recruit 6 (Discharge as of Right) 393 
 394 
‘I used to be full time in the Territorial Army…..this is very different here…….we get picked on 395 
for other’s  mistakes…….I feel I am more experienced than a lot of the people here’. 396 
 397 
Recruit 9 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 398 
 399 
 400 
It is evident that Recruit 9 had created an image of what training was in his own mind, 401 
and in that image the instructor recognised his experience and maybe set him above his peers.  In 402 
reality he was treated no differently from his peers and had great difficulty comprehending this 403 
perceived injustice, which eventually led to him leaving. 404 
 405 
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When recruits talk about the lack of privacy, the confinement in the establishment, or the 406 
difficulty getting along with peers in such close proximity, they appear to have failed to 407 
anticipate or prepare for the environment that they were going to live in.  They seem to have had 408 
no idea what to expect.  When confronted with the environmental reality of what life in a training 409 
barracks entailed they were unable to adapt and cope, Recruit 16 is an example of the results of 410 
those stressors when they become overwhelming: 411 
 412 
‘ I do not want to be in the army, I find it too hard and would rather not do it…..my parents want 413 
me to stay……they feel I am letting myself down… let them down.  I have thought of harming 414 
myself but I know it is wrong, I just need to leave now’ 415 
Recruit 16 (Discharge as of Right) 416 
 417 
Individual Demands 418 
 419 
4.4. Emotional Demands 420 
The lasting impact that the situational stressors had on the recruits’ mood was an 421 
unexpected finding. Subjective Units of Disorder (SUD, (17)) scores were recorded for each 422 
recruit interviewed, firstly at the point that they were thinking about leaving and secondly when 423 
they knew they could go.  Prior to making the decision to leave, the mean SUD score was 3.8 424 
(SD = 2.5) for the 32 transcripts analysed (one recruit refused to give a score).  This score was 425 
not unexpected as recruits had been in a stressful environment, which on the whole they probably 426 
did not enjoy.  What was unexpected was that in just under half of those interviewed (n=16) the 427 
mood score remained below eight even though they had been removed from training and knew 428 
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that they were returning home. In seven of the cases the mood score failed to recover to above 429 
five. The recruits made the following comments: 430 
 431 
‘I find the training hard….discipline hard….I am in trouble most days for making mistakes and 432 
then the whole platoon gets punished….I don’t fit in…..I have been crying myself to  433 
sleep at night..’ (SUD score 5/10 on leaving) 434 
Recruit 15 (Discharge as of Right) 435 
 436 
 These findings suggest that in just under half of those interviewed (n=16) the 437 
experience of training and failure has an impact on their mood which is not automatically 438 
alleviated by removing them from a stressful situation.  In just under a quarter of those 439 
interviewed (n=7) the impact on the mood is arguably moderate to severe, as their mood does not 440 
recover above five prior to leaving.  441 
 442 
Homesickness was reported in just under half of those interviewed (n=15) but was never 443 
given as the primary cause for leaving.  Homesickness was always presented as an aside to other 444 
reasons and was in most cases related to missing parents and girlfriends.  This raises the question 445 
as to whether the individual was missing the physical environment of home, or more probably the 446 
support and companionship of those at home.  This appears to corroborate with the textual data, 447 
as in all the interviews undertaken the recruits who stated that they were homesick would provide 448 
a primary reason for leaving first before saying that they were homesick, e.g.  Recruit 12 is 449 
finding training hard and has decided to leave, giving the following reason: 450 
 451 
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‘army life is not for me…..I don’t like it…not ready for it…..harder than I thought’ 452 
He then goes on to say: 453 
 454 
‘I miss my friends and family’ 455 
Recruit 12 (Discharge as of Right) 456 
 457 
This suggests that as the recruit begins to have difficulty in training and finds it harder to 458 
cope he begins to become homesick for his usual social support network.  Prior to enlistment this 459 
would have been the friends and family that he would turn to in times of difficulty; however on 460 
enlistment he leaves them behind.  Therefore it appears that homesickness is a general word used 461 
to cover many things, but what it actually means in this study is that the recruit is missing his 462 
social support network at a time when struggling to cope with training. 463 
 464 
The stress of family problems is not unlike homesickness.  In all of the cases where 465 
family problems were cited as a reason for leaving (n=6), they were accompanied by other 466 
institutional reasons for not continuing.  Family problems may have been used as an acceptable 467 
reason for leaving instead of the admission of failure.  Recruit 27 is a good example of this 468 
phenomenon: 469 
 470 
‘I prefer to be nearer home to support my family’ 471 
Recruit 27 (Service No Longer Required) 472 
 473 
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Recruits 27’s story is interesting as it supports the anecdotal evidence which was 474 
collected in the planning of the study suggesting that recruits looked to giving legitimate reasons 475 
to their Commanding Officers and peers for leaving. The recruits story suggests that he decided 476 
that he needed to be nearer home to support his family and  that he found the younger recruits 477 
hard to live with as they messed around a lot and caused trouble.  There is no acknowledgement 478 
in his account that he behaved in a way that was unacceptable.  His Commanding Officer’s report 479 
provides a very different account: 480 
 481 
‘adamant that he does not want to be in the Army and has adopted a completely negative attitude 482 
towards the training regime……should be discharged Unfit for Army Service and should not be 483 
allowed to re-enlist’ 484 
Commanding Officer Recruit 27  485 
 486 
In his interview, Recruit 27 created a picture of the Army not being for him and his need 487 
to be with his family.  In his Commanding Officer’s opinion, his behaviour was so disruptive he 488 
was discharged on the basis of ‘Services No Longer Required’, which equates to a dismissal from 489 
employment on discipline grounds.  Of the six cases where family problems were cited as the 490 
reason for leaving only one case was corroborated by the Commanding Officer.  It would appear 491 
recruits were creating institutionally acceptable reasons as to why they had to leave when in 492 
reality they were struggling to cope in the same way as their peers.  In addition to this there was 493 
some suggestion by Commanding Officers that some individuals were also manufacturing their 494 
own discharge by deliberately behaving in a way that would get them dismissed.   495 
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4.5. Summary of Findings 496 
What the data describes is a journey of extreme situational demands that recruits 497 
experience throughout their transition from civilian life to service in the British Infantry. Figure 4 498 
demonstrates how the framework process was used to transparently and systematically reduce the 499 
data from emergent themes to generate mapped outcomes. The narratives of the failed recruits 500 
suggested that enlistment into the Army Infantry was a journey, and during that journey they had 501 
to cope and adapt psychologically and physically to fit into their new surroundings.  What was 502 
also clear was that during the journey or transitional process they had to cope with multiple 503 
demands.  Those demands were situational stressors of an institutional or individual nature (see 504 
Figure 5) and their cumulative effect appeared to erode the recruit’s ability to cope with training. 505 
Figure 5 illustrates two points: (1) it appears that it is the psychological response to the situational 506 
stressors that causes failure, and (2) it rarely appears to be a single situational stressor in isolation 507 
that impacts on the individual, but multiple stressors that have a cumulative effect.  The recruit 508 
reaches a point where they feel that they can no longer cope.  It is at this point that they seem to 509 
make the decision that they no longer belong or (as described by many recruits) they feel they no 510 
longer ‘fit-in’.  511 
 It is the cumulative effect of the situational stressors, combined with the recruit being 512 
dislocated from their established support network, which appears to be the catalyst for failure 513 
amongst recruits.  To succeed in training, the findings suggest that the recruits must possess the 514 
psychological and physical capability to face the challenges and stressors related to enlistment.  515 
The recruit begins the journey of enlistment full of motivation to succeed; they enter training 516 
where a single or numerous stressors have an impact on them, which triggers a cycle of decline 517 
both in mood and performance.  Finally they feel unable to stay any longer as they believe that 518 
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they do not belong and become de-motivated and exit service (Figure 6).  Figure 6 identifies three 519 
phases on the journey to failure; the coping phase, the difficulty in coping phase and the not 520 
coping phase. This structural view is important as it identifies key gates within the process of 521 
recruit failure where recruits could possibly be helped to succeed rather than fail in their training.  522 
 523 
Once the ‘not coping’ stage is reached, the recruit appears to have entered a journey of no 524 
return and exit appears to be the only solution. They did not fail as a direct result of the demands, 525 
but as a result of how the demands made them feel. Once the stress of the demands became too 526 
much, it triggered a sequence of thought processes that led into an irreversible cycle of events and 527 
ultimately training failure.  All leavers, both those who chose to leave and those whose services 528 
were no longer required, discussed a pivotal point in their recruit journey when they made the 529 
conscious decision that they did not ‘fit-in’ to the culture and environment of the military.  It 530 
appears that once this belief had been adopted it became a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Performance 531 
was observed to deteriorate and the recruit reported a subjective lowering of mood, which in turn 532 
compounded the belief that they did not belong and subsequently alienated them from their peers.  533 
The data suggests that once the recruit goes into the cycle of decline (Figure 5) it appears to be 534 
irreversible.   535 
 536 
  537 
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5. Discussion 538 
 539 
Joining the British Army requires a great deal of perseverance and commitment.  It is of 540 
concern that a third of the recruit population in this study were unable to complete infantry 541 
training and that just under half of those that left chose to leave voluntarily. The data suggests 542 
that the infantry forms a society of its own, with its own very distinct identity.  The norms and 543 
values appear to challenge some recruits’ established beliefs, creating psychological turmoil to 544 
such an extent that to achieve relief from that turmoil they leave.   545 
 546 
British society has changed a lot since the wars of the 20th Century; few civilians have 547 
experience of war apart from what they see in the media. As a society it can be argued that 548 
although the United Kingdom has been the victim of terrorist threats for many decades, as a 549 
nation it has not been under a global threat (nuclear annihilation, invasion threat etc.) since the 550 
end of the cold war, and that our society has adapted accordingly. Potentially, the military culture 551 
and expectations bear less and less resemblance to the society which it serves (21).  The values, 552 
beliefs and attitudes of the infantry identity are so different from those of the infantry recruit’s 553 
social and personal identity that an immense psychological demand is placed on the recruit 554 
during the transition into the Infantry.  The data suggests the recruit has to re-categorise their 555 
social identity (22, 23), in order to incorporate a new military identity.  The recruit’s social 556 
identity is very fragile during this period as they re-establishes the hierarchy of their social 557 
categories based on their sense of belonging to the new social group (24, 25). If the recruit is 558 
unable to define himself as a member of this social group, then he becomes at risk of failing. It 559 
appears that the differences between these identities form the catalyst for attrition in infantry 560 
training.  Societal identity has become so detached from military identity that the gap between the 561 
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two worlds is vast, the chasm between them being too great for one third of the population 562 
observed in this study to cross. 563 
  564 
4.1. Coping 565 
Jenkins’ (25) theory of social identity suggests that coping is a learnt strategy that human 566 
beings develop from exposure to their social surroundings. Individually, we learn behaviour and 567 
how to cope by observing the behaviour of others (26). The findings within this study support the 568 
position of the established literature; that individuals in stressful situations do better if they have 569 
access to established social support mechanisms, (27),  for example:  assistance from others, 570 
affirmation of beliefs, sharing practices with the ‘group’, being liked by others and knowing a lot 571 
of people who all know each other (28).  Prior to enlistment, individual recruits may have well 572 
established support mechanisms, but enlistment may strip away almost all the key components 573 
that would define social support. As a consequence of this it appears that if the individual does 574 
not have a robust and established concept of self to cope with separation from their support 575 
network on enlistment into the Army, they risk failure in training.  Difficulty in coping instigated 576 
a sequence of self-doubt about their identity, which in turn undermined the recruit’s confidence in 577 
their performance ability and their self-esteem.  What was observed in effect was a self-fulfilling 578 
prophecy.  The recruit began to believe that he did not belong which in turn affected his 579 
performance; this evoked poor feedback from the instructors which reinforced the recruits own 580 
thoughts of self-doubt.  Very quickly the recruit moved from having difficulty in coping to not 581 
being able to cope with the situation in which he found himself.   582 
 583 
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4.2.  Expectation 584 
 585 
It was evident amongst those recruits that failed to complete the infantry training course 586 
that the transition to military life was a greater challenge than they had expected. When met with 587 
the demands of basic training they were overwhelmed and believed themselves incapable of 588 
meeting the expectations placed upon them; subsequently, their commitment towards training 589 
appeared to wane.  They failed to anticipate or prepare for the environment in which they were 590 
going to live and the physical realities of military life.  They seemed to have had no 591 
understanding of what military culture and service entailed and failed to make sufficient social or 592 
emotional preparation.  However, it must be acknowledged that poor preparation is not the fault 593 
of the recruit alone. It would be too easy to place the blame for false expectations on the recruit 594 
and for the organisation to avoid any reflection on their organisational practice. It is evident that 595 
the Army portrays a positive image, as it has a constant flow of willing volunteers to join. 596 
However, as identified by Tüzün and Cağlar (29) organisational trust is the bridge between 597 
organisational attractiveness and organisational identification and commitment, and if recruits are 598 
deceived with regards to their expectation of service life and infantry training, all trust will be lost 599 
when they are met with the reality of the organisation.  When recruits spoke about how they had 600 
not anticipated the regime in training, they were verbalising the dissonance between expectations 601 
and reality. Arguably, this caused a breakdown of trust between the recruit and the Army with the 602 
recruit no longer being attracted to the organisation or willing to stay. 603 
 604 
The problem of recruits being misinformed about service life is not isolated to this study. 605 
Hampson (10) and Sirett (16) have previously identified that there was a mismatch between the 606 
expectations of recruits and the reality of training. Both Hampson (10) and Sirett (16) identified 607 
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that the initial demands of the first weeks of training were the major cause of discharge and their 608 
findings are consistent with the present study as regards the cumulative demands identified that 609 
are associated with failure.  610 
 611 
The finding that the recruit is most vulnerable to attrition when are in the  transition 612 
period between cultures is not a new finding. Hampson (10) and Sirett (16) formed the same 613 
conclusions based on a broader Army population.  However, to accept the above reason as a 614 
complete understanding for failure is to over simplify the problem.  It places the blame for failure 615 
firmly with the recruit and does not reflect the role that the organisation plays in recruit failure.  616 
This study identifies the multiple situational demands that recruits are exposed to and also 617 
identifies the effect which it has on them, and the cognitive processes that are a result of them.  618 
Most importantly, it identifies when the recruit is most vulnerable to failure and how they make 619 
the decision to leave.  620 
 621 
4.3. Enlistment process 622 
 623 
The findings of this study has identified that among recruits who don’t complete training 624 
there appear to be gateways through which  recruits pass on a journey to failure, where they make 625 
the transition from coping to not coping.  The findings suggest that once a recruit has entered the 626 
exit phase then there is little hope of recovery. Therefore, research and interventions at the exit 627 
phase would not be recommended as the financial cost of letting recruits progress that far into 628 
training with little chance of successful recovery would not make it cost effective. This leaves the 629 
enlistment phase and the training phase as potential stages for intervention. This identified 630 
training cost is a key factor when considering potential interventions during the enlistment phase.  631 
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The longer a recruit, who is ultimately going to fail, remains in training, the greater the cost of 632 
training failure overall both financially and personally.  The goal is to achieve a balance between 633 
attaining minimal manpower wastage and maximising training success, thereby reducing the 634 
financial cost of training wastage overall. 635 
 636 
In order to better understand the recruits’ journey into infantry training Figure 7 provides 637 
a diagrammatic picture of the enlistment journey.  The point of entry into service (the point when 638 
they leave home and commence training at the Infantry Training Centre) is described by the 639 
recruits who failed and is illustrated here as vertical challenge, a cliff which they must climb.  640 
This vertical climb incorporates the demands of enlistment, and all of the demands which apply 641 
pressure to the recruits coping strategies.  642 
  643 
The dotted line in Figure 7 demonstrates a potential solution which could reduce the 644 
transitional impact that enlistment has on the recruit in the early stages of recruit training.  This 645 
study has identified that at the point the recruit enters the Infantry Training Centre they are faced 646 
with overwhelming institutional and individual demands that they were clearly not prepared for, 647 
and these demands have an impact on their ability to cope with the dislocation from their 648 
established support networks (families and friends). They are placed in a restrictive environment, 649 
with little privacy, and with total strangers. It is argued that this has an irreversible impact on 650 
some recruits who very quickly, in the first days and weeks of training, realise that they have 651 
made a mistake and that they do not belong in the Army. Unfortunately, Army Regulations 652 
stipulate that they must remain in service for 28 days before they can leave. All the sample left 653 
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training within the first 6 weeks, and either left at the 28 day point by their own volition or were 654 
dismissed on the grounds of unsuitability or poor discipline. 655 
 656 
It is therefore argued that it is the sudden impact of this transition from the family home 657 
into military training which is the catalyst for their ability to cope to be overwhelmed. Although 658 
their exit does not occur until many weeks later, it is argued that the journey to failure 659 
commences very soon after beginning infantry training.  660 
 661 
A slower integration during the enlistment process, that is prior to commencement of 662 
residential training at the Infantry Training Centre, may be one way in which the impact of the 663 
transition to the military can be minimised.  Figure 7 proposes that rather than presenting the 664 
recruit with a short, intense, overwhelming transition into training that risks high attrition, it 665 
would be better to introduce the recruit to the Army through a graduated transitional period 666 
during the enlistment phase. By having a series of  acquaint visits or taster sessions at the training 667 
centre, potential recruits could develop a greater insight into what exactly training and life in the 668 
infantry entails and if managed correctly could throughout this period begin to develop 669 
friendships and support networks that they could carry through into the training phase. Most 670 
importantly, those recruits that decide that the Army Infantry was not for them could make the 671 
decision to withdraw during the enlistment phase and would not be trapped in the Army for a 672 
month before they could get out. 673 
 674 
  675 
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 4.4. Summary 676 
 677 
In summary, there are clearly defined areas where either further research or changes to 678 
current practice may provide a better understanding of, and ultimately reduce, the current attrition 679 
rates experienced by the Infantry Training Centre.  More openness and honesty by the Army 680 
during the recruitment process will allow potential recruits to make a more informed decision as 681 
to whether they are suited to the infantry role.  In addition, more knowledge of the training and 682 
what is expected of them will help recruits to better prepare both physically and psychologically 683 
for training.   684 
 685 
The Army should consider approaching the problem of recruit attrition from two 686 
perspectives. First, they must reduce the number of recruits lost during the training process and 687 
second, reduce the financial cost of wastage.  Though related, these are distinct objectives.  The 688 
Army appears to accept that there will always be training wastage, however, this must be 689 
minimised by a more supportive and graduated transitional process, which will allow recruits 690 
who are unhappy to withdraw with immediate effect.  It is argued that the transitional phase 691 
should be part of the enlistment process before a recruit commences the infantry training course. 692 
There has to be a distinction between the transitional period and the commencement of infantry 693 
training, as this would go some way to ensuring that only those who are motivated and accepting 694 
of military life enter the common infantry course.  A graduated induction into service would 695 
potentially reduce the amount of attrition on the common infantry course and reduce the cost of 696 
wastage as recruits would leave during the transitional phase prior to commencement of training.  697 
More importantly, it would go some way to reducing the personal and psychological impact of 698 
training failure on those recruits that leave training. 699 
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Table 1: Training outcomes with reason for failure 771 
 772 
 
Outcome 
n (%) 
Passed 637 (63.8%)  
Failed 362 (36.2%)  
 Discharge as of Right  170 (47%) 
 Services No Longer Required (discipline)  21 (5.8%) 
 Services No Longer Required (drugs)  2 (0.6%) 
 Released from Army Service  45 (12.4%) 
 Absent Without Leave (AWOL)  4 (1.1%) 
 Medical Discharge (physical)  58 (16%) 
 Transfer to Other Corps/Service  16 (4.4%) 
 Unsuitable for Army Service  27 (7.5%) 
 Unable to meet medical requirements of 
service  
19 (5.2%) 
  Total 362 (100%) 
  773 
 774 
  775 
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Figure 1: Semi Structured Interview Template 776 
 777 
Figure 1: Semi Structured Interview Template 
 
Why are you leaving?  
 
How would you feel / what behaviour would you engage in if you 
could not leave?  
 
How are you coping between making the decision / being told, to 
leave and now waiting to leave?  
 
How is your mood at this point in time? What was the worst 
time? (SUD Scale of 1-10) 
 
Did contact with your family whilst serving make things better or 
worse? 
 
Could you suggest any changes or support that would enable 
you to stay in the army? 
 
 778 
 779 
  780 
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Figure 2: Categorisation of reasons for discharge in training 781 
Reason  
Discharge As Of Right The recruit can leave the Army after 28 days up until the end 
of his Phase 2 Training 
Services No Longer Required The Army Discharges the Recruit as a result of a breach of 
discipline 
Released from Army Service The Army releases the Recruit from service (usually used for 
very unhappy recruits and those found to be incompatible 
with military life). A release from service by mutual consent 
and no blame apportioned. 
Absent Without Leave (AWOL) Recruits that leave the training camp without permission are 
dismissed on the grounds of being absent without leave 
Medical Discharge (physical) The recruit develops an injury or illness that is not 
compatible with military service and they are discharged on 
medical grounds. 
Transfer to Other Corps/Service Recruits who are not happy or incompatible with infantry 
service but wish to remain in the army may transfer to 
another career employment group within the scope of their 
original GTI score. 
Unsuitable for Army Service The recruit is found to be unsuitable for Army service and is 
released from training. 
Unable to meet medical requirements of 
service 
The recruit is unable to meet the medical standards for 
continuation of training i.e. re-emergence of childhood 
asthma 
 782 
  783 
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Figure 3: Cycle of decline 784 
  785 
Deteriorating 
mood 
Deteriorating 
Performance 
Deteriorating 
mood 
Deteriorating 
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Figure 4: Process of analysis: Mapping and Interpretation 
 
  
Areas of Enquiry 
 
Reason for leaving 
 
Psychological impact of failure 
 
Stability of mood related to failure 
 
Expectations of service 
 
Motivators to stay 
 
Benefit of close family contact in early 
training 
 
Objective view of causative reasons 
for failure from training staff 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Themes 
 
1. Transitional period when adapting to 
new social environment with poor 
expectation of what military life entailed 
 
2. An inability to cope with the impact of 
transition to military life within a closed 
institution 
 
3. Deterioration in psychological wellbeing 
and performance of the individual as they 
begin to acknowledge that they can no 
longer cope 
 
4. Legitimisation of failure 
 
 
Thematic Headings with Index 
 
Coping 
 
1.1 Deterioration in Mood 
1.2  Homesick 
1.3  Unable to cope 
psychologically with physical 
demands 
1.4 Immaturity 
1.5 Relationship Failure / 
problems at home  / sick 
relative 
1.6 Contact with Family 
 
Fitting In 
 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
2.5  Inappropriate recruitment 
 
Transition  
 
3.1 Psychologically and 
physically unprepared for 
transition to service 
3.2 Option to leave made too 
easy (National Service 
Ethos) 
3.3 Lack of determination to 
push through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional 
maturity to cope with the 
transitional period 
 
Legitimisation of failure 
 
4.1 Bad behaviour to ensure 
dismissal 
4.2 Create a demand that 
necessitates exit from 
service 
 
Situational Demand 
 
Institutional Demands 
 
1.1 Deterioration in Mood 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with physical 
demands 
1.4  Immaturity 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
3.3  Lack of determination to 
push through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional 
maturity to cope with the 
transitional period 
 
Individual Demands 
 
1.2 Homesick 
1.5 Relationship Failure / 
problems at home  / sick 
relative 
1.6 Contact with Family 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Demand 
 
Physical Demands 
 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with physical 
demands 
 
Cultural Demands 
 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
3.3  Lack of determination  
3.4 Lacking the emotional 
maturity to cope with the 
transitional period 
 
 
Individual Demand 
 
Emotional 
  
1.1 Deterioration in mood 
1.2 Homesick 
1.4 Immaturity 
 
Social 
 
 
1.5 Relationship Failure / 
problems at home  / sick 
 
 1.5a  Pregnancy 
 1.5b  Family Illness 
 1.5c  No support from 
significant other(s) 
 
  
Familirisation Thematic Framework  
with index Charting Mapping 
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Figure 5: Impact of multiple situational stressors on the recruit’s ability to complete training 
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Figure 6: Journey to discharge 
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Figure 7: Enlistment journey 
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